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THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVATE
UNIVERSITIES' RACIAL PREFERENCES AND SPEECH CODES
David E. Bernstein*
The reaction to Boy Scouts of America v. Dale has divided along ideological
lines. Conservatives generally support Dale because in their eyes it prevents the
government from taking sides in the culture wars. "Progressives, "including many
liberals who otherwise have strong civil libertarian instincts, oppose Dale because
it inhibits the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in some contexts. The
underlying issue in Dale was whether a private, nonprofit expressive association
has a First Amendment right to discriminate to prevent dilution of its message.
Despite the ideological rancor over Dale, this right does not favor groups with any
particular perspective, but protects any group when its right to expressive
association is threatened by an antidiscrimination law. Indeed, despite general
liberal opposition to Dale, the opinion may protect some of the left's favorite
causes.
Dale recognizes that private, nonprofit expressive associations have a First
Amendment right to discriminate when necessary to prevent dilution of their
message. For example, to the chagrin of civil rights activists, both white and black
racist and racialist groups will have a right to exclude members of other races from
membership and events sponsored by the groups. However, Professor Bernstein
asserts that the most significant nonprofit organizations with an ideological
commitment to discrimination are not 'acist organizations, but elite private
universities that engage in racial preferences in favor of minority applicants.
Private universities faced with reverse discrimination lawsuits may find
constitutional respite in the right to expressive association if they are willing to
admit that they engage in racial preferences.
More generally, Dale stands for a robust right of expressive association. One
way organizations protect their ability to express a particular message is by
banning their opponents from speaking in their organizations. California's
Leonard Law makes university speech codes illegal, and several state constitutions
arguably do the same. Professor Bernstein concludes thatprivate university speech
codes--a cause typically favored by elements on the political left-are protected
against hostile regulations by the expressive association right recognized in Dale.
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. Michael Abramowicz,
John McGinnis, and Eugene Volokh provided helpful comments. The George Mason
University School of Law and its Law and Economics Center provided funding for this
Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,' the Supreme Court ruled that the Scouts has
a First Amendment expressive association right to exclude gay adult volunteers.'
The reaction to Dale has divided along ideological lines. Conservatives generally
support Dale because in their eyes it prevents the government from taking sides in
the culture wars. "Progressives," including many liberals who otherwise have
strong civil libertarian instincts, oppose Dale because it seems to deal a blow to gay
rights. Progressives also fear that organizations that wish to discriminate against
other groups will rely on Dale for constitutional exemptions from antidiscrimination
laws.
As a legal matter, however, Dale was not about the Kulturkampf between gay
rights activists and their conservative opponents, nor was it about a general "right
to discriminate."3 Rather, the underlying issue in Dale was whether a private,
nonprofit expressive association has a First Amendment right to discriminate to
prevent dilution of its message.4
Support for the right of expressive association naturally varies depending on
whose ox is being gored in a particular case. For example, the Supreme Court first
explicitly recognized the right of expressive association in protecting the NAACP
against harassment by southern state governments. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,5 the Court quashed Alabama's attempt to subpoena thb state NAACP's
membership list, which would have been used by the White Citizens Council to
punish activists.6 However, when civil rights activists later had the upper hand, they
persuaded a federal district court to require segregated private schools to supply to
the Internal Revenue Service a list "of incorporators, founders, board members;
listing of donors of land or buildings, whether individual or corporate; and a
statement as to whether any of the foregoing have an announced identification as
officers or active members of an organization having as a primary objective the
530 U.S. 640; 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
2 Id
3 Id. at 2476.
4 Id. at 2446.
' 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
6 The Court stated "that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." Id. at 460. The Court added
that "it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect
of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." Id at 460-61; see
also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
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maintenance of segregated school education."' More recently, at the same time a
gay rights organization in Massachusetts was fighting to force the organizers of
Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade to allow a gay organization to march under its
own banner, a San Diego gay rights organization was fighting a petition by an anti-
gay organization calling itself "Normal People" seeking to march in the city's
annual gay pride parade."
While the right of expressive association can protect organizations on either
side of the political spectrum, for the last two decades the right has primarily been
raised as a defense to antidiscrimination claims by African Americans, women, and
especially homosexuals. Not surprisingly, left-leaning organizations have sought
to limit strictly the scope of the right, while conservatives have been more
supportive of the right of private associations to autonomy from the state. As
discussed below, however, the left may find that the right to expressive association
will save some of its favorite causes from interference by the government.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history of the expressive association
right and its relationship to antidiscrimination law. Part II argues that in some
contexts Dale provides a constitutional defense to antidiscrimination laws by
nonprofit organizations when the organizations' ideology requires discrimination.
As discussed in Part II, both white and black racist and racialist groups have a right
to exclude members of other races.
The rest of this Article shows that despite the political left's hostility to Dale,
two causes associated with the left may ultimately be among the most significant
beneficiaries of Dale. Part Ill explains that the most significant nonprofit
organizations with an ideological commitment to discrimination are not overtly
racist organizations, but elite private universities that engage in racial preferences
in favor of minority applicants. Private universities faced with reverse
discrimination lawsuits may find constitutional respite in the right to expressive
association if they are willing to admit that they engage in racial preferences.
Part IV opines that private university speech codes may also be protected by
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1176 (D.D.C.), aff'dsub nom., Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971). In 1969, attorneys for the Lawyers' Committee for'Civil Rights and
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund sued the Internal Revenue Service in United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for granting tax-exempt status to racially exclusionary
private schools in Mississippi. See id. Acting at the behest of the plaintiffs, the court issued
the order quoted in the text above. Id. The Lawyers' Committee and the Legal Defense Fund
were willing to subject their enemies to the possibility of reprisals from one of the most
powerful and feared federal agencies.
' See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 555, 557
(1995); K. L. Billingsley, Judge Bars Opposition from Gay Parade, WASH. TIMES, July 16,
1994, at 43.
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Dale. California's Leonard Law9 essentially makes such speech codes illegal," and
several state constitutions arguably do the same." When Stanford University
defended its speech code on expressive association grounds, the court relied on
Roberts in upholding the constitutionality of the Leonard Law. 2 After Dale,
however, state regulations banning private schools from enforcing speech codes
should be invalidated on expressive association grounds."
1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DALE AND THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the
right to expressive association in the 1950s, when state harassment threatened the
viability of civil rights organizations in the South. The right was ill-defined for the
next several decades; for example, it was unclear whether the right originated in the
First Amendment or was part of a more general right to association derived from the
Due Process Clause or elsewhere. In the 1980s, litigants aggressively asserted the
right of expressive association as a defense to public accommodations statutes."
This forced the Supreme Court to clarify the origins and scope of the right.
The most important expressive association case was Roberts v. United States
Jaycees." The national Jaycees organization threatened two Minnesota chapters
with expulsion for admitting women as full members. The state chapters sued,
claiming that the national organization's policy violated Minnesota's public
accommodations law.' 6 The national Jaycees defended its membership policy on
First Amendment grounds. After a short-lived victory for the national Jaycees in
the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court reversed. 7
The Court stated that the right to associate for expressive purposes was
implicitly protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of the rights to freedom
9 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94, 367 (West Supp. 2001).
'0 See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
See infra note 105.
12 See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
" In fairness, at least one left-wing organization, the ACLU, generally opposes campus
speech codes. See infra notes. 101-03 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1988); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 543 (1987); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707
P.2d 212, 220 (Cal. 1985).
'5 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
16 United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1981).
' United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982), rev 'd, 709 F.2d
1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'dsubnom., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
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of expression, assembly, and to petition government. 8 However, the Court found
that the national Jaycees could not assert successfully a First Amendment right to
expressive association because there was no evidence that the compelled acceptance
of women as Jaycees would "change the content or impact of the organization's
speech."' 9 The Court argued that admitting women required no change in the
organization's central purpose: "promoting the interests of young men."'2
Moreover, even if Minnesota's public accommodations law infringed on the
Jaycees' right to expressive association, it did so to advance compelling interests,
i.e., eliminating gender discrimination and ensuring "equal access to publicly
available goods and services."'" Because the law served compelling government
interests, it trumped the Jaycees' First Amendment rights.
Although the interest in forcing the Jaycees to admit women was purportedly
compelling, federal law did not (and still does not) forbid public accommodations
to discriminate on the basis of sex. The Court justified its decision by citing the
Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that Minnesota had a "strong historical
commitment to eliminating discrimination."2 The Court failed to explain how a
federal constitutional right could be overridden by a single state's claimed
compelling interest, an interest not even protected by federal statute.'
Between Roberts' narrow interpretation of what would interfere with the
Jaycees' right of expressive association, and its languid compelling interest test,
Roberts suggested that expressive association need not be taken seriously,
especially when enforcement of an antidiscrimination law was in jeopardy.24 Boy
I8 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
19 Id at 627-28. In fact, Rotary International's amicus brief pointed to the "gender gap"
in political views. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International at 18, Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724).
20 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
21 Id at 624.
22 Id
2 For criticism of the notion that a single state's law can create a compelling interest for
First Amendment purposes, see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal ights Commission, 165 F.3d
692, 716 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Nor, would it seem, can a single state's law evince-under any
standard-a compelling government interest for federal constitutional purposes."), rev 'don
other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). For the contrary view, see Gay Rights
Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1,46
(1987) (Newman, J., concurring) ("an interest need not be national in scope to be
compelling"). See generally Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1987) (holding that the District
of Columbia's compelling interest in suppressing speech cannot trump First Amendment
rights).
24 In fact, the Court soon rejected two other expressive association challenges to public
accommodations laws. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd.
of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale" marks the end of the Roberts era.
In Dale, the Supreme Court clearly held for the first time that the right of
expressive association trumps an antidiscrimination law. James Dale, an openly gay
individual, had sued the Scouts under New Jersey's public accommodations law
when the Scouts refused to employ him as a scoutmaster. The Court found that
because the Boy Scouts had a viewpoint opposed to homosexual activity that it
sought to impart to its members, the Scouts had a constitutional right to exclude
Dale from the organization.
The contrast with Roberts is evident. First, the majority declined the dissent's
invitation to find that New Jersey's public accommodations law did not infringe
upon expressive association rights.26 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
noted that the Scouts claimed to have an anti-homosexual activity ideology, that
there was evidence in the record to support that claim, and that the organization's
ability to promote that message would be undermined inherently if it was required
to employ an open and active homosexual.27
The Court concluded that application of the New Jersey law to the Scouts
"would significantly burden the [Scouts'] right to oppose or disfavor homosexual
conduct."2 "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the
organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the
Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."29 This
was sufficient to support an expressive association claim, and New Jersey's
antidiscrimination law therefore violated the Scouts' First Amendment rights.
Moreover, despite lip service paid to Roberts and its weak compelling interest
test, neither the majority opinion nor the dissent discussed whether the government
has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals." Dale
therefore suggests that the Court has reached a consensus both that the right to
expressive association receives the same level of protection as other elements of the
right to freedom of expression, and that there is no antidiscrimination law exception
25 530 U.S. 640; 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
26 The dissent argued that the Boy Scouts did not really promote an anti-homosexual
activity message, id. at 2460-72, and, moreover, allowing Dale to serve as a scoutmaster
would not undermine any such message the Scouts sought to send. Id. at 2472-77.
27 Id. at 2452-54.
28 Id. at 2457.
29 Id. at 2454. A better way of formulating the specific problem raised in Dale is that
employing Dale would have inhibited the Scouts' ability to send a clear message that
homosexual activity is not a legitimate form of behavior, given that Dale's acknowledged
behavior openly contradicts that message.
30 The majority, in fact, treated the part of Roberts which applies the compelling interest
test as dicta because the Roberts Court had found that the right of expressive association had
not been infringed in that case. Id. at 2456; see David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws
and the First Amendment, 66 Mo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001).
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to the right of expressive association.3
Thus, Dale is significant in two respects. First, the Court has signaled that it
wants to rejuvenate the right to expressive association, and will no longer try to
bend the facts of cases so as to avoid recognizing the right when enforcement of an
antidiscrimination law is at issue. Moreover, the Court interpreted the right of
expressive association broadly. The Court held that the right could be successfully
asserted by an organization that does not associate for the express purpose of
disseminating the particular message at issue, that propounds the message only
implicitly by example, and that tolerates dissenting views.32 Second, once the
infringement upon the right to expressive association has been recognized, the party
asserting the right will win, unless the government can assert the type of truly
compelling interest that (almost never) trumps First Amendment rights in other
contexts.
11. RACIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
Dale raises the issue of whether associations that are ideologically committed
to race discrimination may discriminate on the basis of race. In Runyon v.
McCrary,33 the United States Supreme Court rejected a freedom of association
defense to an antidiscrimination claim against a private school. The Court
explained that although invidious private discrimination may be characterized as an
exercise of freedom of association, it is not accorded affirmative constitutional
protection. Applying an antidiscrimination statute to prohibit private, nonsectarian
schools from denying admission to African American students would not violate
their right of free association where "'there is no showing that discontinuance of
[the] discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in
these schools of any ideas or dogma."'34 In the absence of a valid First Amendment
claim, "'the Constitution ... places no value on discrimination, and... [i]nvidious
private discrimination . . . has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections.""'
"t However, the four dissenting Justices apparently would still give antidiscrimination
laws a bit of what looks like special treatment. Justice Stevens, writing for the four, argued
that in expressive association cases, unlike in other First Amendment contexts, courts should
not take defendants' purported beliefs at face value, but should investigate whether these
beliefs are merely a cover for status-based discrimination. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2471. The only
rationale they gave for this distinction was the potential negative effect on antidiscrimination
laws of adopting the contrary position. Id at 2471-72.
32 Id at 2454-55.
33 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
34 Id at 176 (alteration in original) (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087
(4th Cir. 1975)).
31 Id. (first and third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Norwood v.
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Many scholars read Runyon as rejecting a well-developed expressive
association claim. Indeed, Dale's attorney relied heavily on Runyon," and the Boy
Scouts' reply brief took pains to explain how the Court could find for the Scouts
while leaving Runyon undisturbed.38 Some would argue that Runyon could only be
squared with Dale if claims of race discrimination in education get different
treatment under the First Amendment than a sexual orientation discrimination claim
such as Dale's. 9
In fact, however, Runyon does not conflict with Dale. First, Runyon involved
a for-profit, commercially-operated school.' In a concurrence in Roberts,4 Justice
O'Connor, a member of the five-Justice majority in Dale, found that the right of
expressive association applies only to primarily expressive, non-commercial
organizations. For-profit businesses presumably may not claim the right. Until
there are five votes on the Court to extend protection for expressive association
rights to for-profit organizations,42 the holding of Runyon will survive Dale.
Even more important, a close reading of Runyon and the briefs filed in it reveal
that Runyon was not an "expressive association" case. The defendants in
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973)).
36 This Author, relying on the conventional wisdom, made this mistake. See David E.
Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus CivilLiberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGALF. 133, 167.
17 Brief for Respondant, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640; 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (No. 99-699).
38 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19 n.17, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120
S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699).
39 Some have suggested that the Reconstruction Amendments grant special privileges to
laws banning discrimination against African Americans (and perhaps other groups that get
special suspect class or quasi-suspect class treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment) that
do not apply to other groups. Protecting the former groups from discrimination would be a
compelling government interest, but protecting homosexuals would not be. Cf William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions
of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2458-60 (1997)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court is less willing to defer to antidiscrimination laws when
the protected group is homosexuals than in other contexts). However, there is no indication
in Dale that the Court for First Amendment purposes would distinguish laws that protect
different groups. The question Dale requires courts to answer is whether the law at issue
interferes with an organization's ability to promote its message. Given that the Court did not
even bother to apply the compelling interest test, it appears that whether the group being
discriminated against gets a given level of protection from state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment is irrelevant.
o See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 161 (noting that the school in question was "commercially-
operated").
4" Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632-38 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
42 So far, no Justice in the Dale majority has stated that for-profit organizations are
protected by the right of expressive association.
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Runyon made what amounts to a short, throw-away argument that their right to
"freedom of association," floating somewhere in the penumbral ether of the
Constitution, was violated by compelled integration. However, the defendants did
not make an expressive association claim grounded in the First Amendment. They
did not argue in their briefs that the school's ability to promote segregation would
be compromised, nor did they provide evidence at trial on that issue.4" The Runyon
Court ruled that the defendants failed to allege that their First Amendment
expressive association rights were violated, not that a racist organization could
never establish such a claim."
Most courts have therefore ignored Runyon in cases involving conflicts between
expressive association rights and antidiscrimination laws, and instead focused on
the Roberts test. For example, in Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont,"5 the Klan sued after being denied a parade on the
grounds that the parade was a public accommodation, but would not be open to
members of minority groups as required by law. The Klan argued that its white
supremacist message would be diluted if its parade was open to a public that for the
3 Petitioner's Brief, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (No. 75-62).
4 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-76. It is true that the brief of the Southern Independent
School Association, at 26-27, argued:
If the SISA parents have a right to select a school for their children that
expresses their own preferences and beliefs, is that right invaded by the
decisions below? Clearly so. Every parent who selects a SISA school because
of a belief that 'segregation is desirable in education' has lost any opportunity
of expressing that belief if by the Thirteenth or any other amendment all public
or private schools must become desegregated.
Brief of Southern Independent Sch. Ass'n 26-27, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
(No. 75-62). Moreover, the Reply Brief adds:
[Tihe ... proposals to eliminate or integrate the SISA schools are directly
related to the restriction of communication by the SISA parents-to the point
of eliminating the last refuge in which their belief can presently find expression.
The responding briefs claim that SISA parents will remain free to believe in the
value of segregation in education-but argue the contradictory provision that
this belief must only be expressed in an integrated private school.
Reply Brief of Southern Independent Sch. Ass'n 8, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976) (No. 75-62). However, these are not Dale-style arguments that the schools' ability
to teach that segregation is good would be diminished. Rather, they are broad freedom of
association arguments that the parents could not express their beliefs in segregation by
sending their kids to a segregated school. The SISA's argument would apply just as well to
a restaurant patron who claimed that the 1964 Civil Rights Act prevents him from expressing
his belief in segregation by going to a segregated restaurant. Dale stands for the principle
that the government cannot force association that would dilute an organized group's
message, not that individuals have a right to associate with whom they please because
otherwise they will not be able to express their belief in segregation.
"s 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988).
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most part violently disagrees with the Klan's ideology.
The district court recognized that Roberts and not Runyon was the governing
precedent. Even under Roberts, however, it was not at all clear that the Ku Klux
Klan had the right to exclude African Americans from its march. Indeed, Roberts
suggests that because the government has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against African Americans and Jews, the Klan's right of expressive
association would have to yield to the law. The district court resolved this dilemma
by ignoring the majority opinion in Roberts, and relying instead on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. The court noted that forcing the Klan to allow African
Americans to march in its parade would "change the primary message which the
KKK advocates." '6 As a nonprofit, primarily expressive association, the Klan had
a First Amendment right to discriminate to avoid this harm.
Similarly, in City of Cleveland v. Nation of Islam,47 a federal district court held
that Cleveland acted improperly when it refused to rent a public building to the
Nation of Islam. The Nation planned to hold a men-only meeting in the Cleveland
Convention Center in violation of Ohio's public accommodations statute. On
motion for a declaratory judgment from the city, the court found for the Nation of
Islam on what amounts to expressive association grounds. The court found that
"[i]f the City is allowed to make the public accommodation law requiring Minister
Farrakhan to speak to a mixed audience, the content and character of the speech will
necessarily be changed.""8 This court avoided considering the city's compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination, as seemingly required by Roberts, by
couching its holding in general freedom of speech terms, rather than more
specifically relying on the expressive association right."9
By contrast, in Southgate v. United African Movement,"0 the New York City
Commission on Human Rights rejected the idea that a Black separatist organization
had a constitutional right to exclude whites from its otherwise public meetings. The
commission acknowledged that United African Movement"' proved "that there is
a nexus between its racially discriminatory membership policies and the group's
message that Caucasians and people of African descent should not mix.""s Forcing
the Movement to admit whites to its meetings diluted the group's message, which
46 ld at 289.
"7 922 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
"'Id at 59.
9 See Lauren J. Rosenblum, Equal Access or Free Speech: The Constitutionality of
Public Accommodations Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243 (1997).
'0 No. MPA 95-0851, PA 95-0031, 1997 WL 1051933 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts. June
30, 1997).
" For background on the United Africa Movement, see Shawn M. Larsen, For Blacks
Only: The Associational Freedoms ofPrivate Minority Clubs, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 3 59
(1999).
32 Southgate, 1997 WL 1051933.
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infringed upon its right to expressive association." The commission concluded,
however, that under Roberts New York had a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination on the basis of race, and that this interest trumped the Movement's
First Amendment rights.m
Dale resolves all of these cases on the side of the right of expressive
association. To force separatist groups to integrate themselves, or even their
audiences, would inhibit the ability of such organizations to preach separatism at
least as much as forcing the Boy Scouts to employ Dale would have interfered with
the Scouts' anti-homosexual activity message. Regardless of statutory law, the
Constitution protects the right of a nonprofit segregationist school to exclude
African Americans, of the Ku Klux Klan to discriminate against African Americans
and Jews, of the Nation of Islam to exclude women, and of the United African
Movement to limit its members and audiences to African Americans.
III. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AND RACIAL PREFERENCES
IN PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES
Overtly racist and sexist organizations are not the only private, nonprofit,
primarily expressive groups that have an ideology that leads them to discriminate.
Many private universities seek to instill in their students an appreciation of the
importance of racial diversity at the highest levels of society. These universities
I ld. Cf Alexis Chiu, Woman Sues Nation of Islam, Associated Press, Aug. 6, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 22031085. Marceline Donaldson, a sixty-something, African
American, former civil rights worker, closed her antique shop early to attend a speech by
Louis Farrakhan at Boston's Strand Theater with her husband. "Being turned away at the
door by a black man was overwhelming. When he moved me aside, my blood pressure
started to go up." Id Nation of Islam security turned her away, explaining that the meeting
was for men only. The Donaldsons sued for compensatory and punitive damages for the
emotional stress they suffered and also injunctive relief to prevent the Nation of Islam from
discriminating in who it admits to public meetings. "'My life has been about fighting for
civil rights,' Donaldson said. 'I have lived through 'Colored only' signs, 'Whites only' signs.
Then, in Boston, in 1994, to be turned away at the door by a black man . . . it was
overwhelming."' Bryan Robinson, African-American Couple Takes Nation of Islam and
Farrakhan to Court Over Alleged Discrimination, Court TV Online, at
http://www.courttv.com/trials/farrakhan/080499_ctv.html (Aug. 4, 1999) (ellipses in
original). A state court judge eventually dismissed the case, stating that "[f]reedom of
religion and freedom of religious expression, which traditionally will exempt a religion from
certain discrimination laws, is applicable here." Suit Against Nation of Islam Tossed,
Associated Press, Aug. 10, 1999, available at 1999 WL 22032294.
Ms. Donaldson failed to notice an obvious irony-she was eager to attend a talk given
by the leader of a racist and anti-Semitic organization, but became angry only when the
organization discriminated against her.
' Southgate, 1997 WL 1051933.
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consider the promotion of "diversity"" so important that they use racial
preferences--often massive racial preferenceS16-in their admissions process to
achieve diverse student bodies.
Few schools directly admit that they engage in racial preferences.57 Instead,
their representatives hem and haw, expressing their commitment to diversity and
affirmative action while also claiming that the minority students they accept arejust
as well-qualified as the white students." Consider Dean Herma Hill Kay of Boalt
11 I put "diversity" in quotation marks because at many schools the concept seems limited
to racial diversity, and even then non-left-wing members of racial minority groups are not
thought to contribute to "diversity." See generally Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy,
and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REv. 2059 (1996).
56 Some have argued that racial preferences are basically limited to the top twenty
percent of American universities that have selective admissions policies. See Thomas J.
Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971 (1998).
The gaps in SAT scores between white and African American students at these schools can
be substantial. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK
AND WHITE 408 tbl. 9 (1997) (reporting large gaps at several elite universities). The gaps
may be even greater at schools that are selective, but not at the Ivy League or equivalent
level. One scholar estimates that the average "plus" given to African American and Hispanic
applicants at such schools is worth approximately 400 SAT points. See Kane, supra, at 991.
A recent study of state universities suggests that while the most selective schools have the
strongest racial preference programs, almost all schools utilize such preferences to some
degree. Robert Lemer & Althea K. Nagai, Pervasive Preferences: Racial and Ethnic
Discrimination in Undergraduate Admissions Across the Nation (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.ceousa.org/html/multi.html.
" See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 14 (1991)
("it sometimes seems as though the [affirmative action] programs are not supposed to have
any beneficiaries"); Lemer & Nagai, supra note 56 (stating that while there has been
grudging acknowledgment that preferences are used, "very little information has been
disclosed to the public").
" Professor Samuel Issacharoff mockingly refers to this as the "Georgetown defense."
See Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 672
n.9 (1998). A decade ago, Georgetown Law Center was rocked with controversy when a
student employee in the admissions office revealed that African American students at
Georgetown Law had significantly lower test scores and GPAs than did white students. See
Ken Myers, Georgetown Battle Is Concluded, But War of Words Doesn't Let Up, NAT'L
L.J., June 10, 1991, at 4; Ken Myers, Article in Georgetown Newspaper Sparks
Investigation at University, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 29, 1991, at 4. Anyone who paid attention to
law school admissions statistics was well aware that the only way Georgetown could have
a class with eleven percent African American representation was to engage in significant
racial preferences, indeed preferences almost certainly far more significant than any given
to any other discreet group, such as children of alumni. See, e.g., Linda F. Wightman, The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of
Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. I,
16 tbl. 5 (1997). Dean Judith Areen refused to defend forthrightly Georgetown's policy of
racial preferences, instead penning a defense of Georgetownis policies that can only be
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Hall Law School's response when she was asked on national television in April
1995 why there was "a widespread perception that the minorities who are admitted
with those special considerations are the result of standards being lowered."59 Kay
responded that law schools do not lower standards to admit minorities. Rather,
when schools "'choose between two equally qualified persons,' ... [they] pick the
'person of color' in order to 'do something about the really fundamental problem
of racial prejudice in this society."'
described as a masterful example of lawyerly evasion and circumlocution. See Judith C.
Areen, Affirmative Action: The Benefits of Diversity, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at D7.
While Areen claimed that the student employee's claims were misleading and tendentious,
she refused to reveal the actual underlying statistics. See also Stephan Themstrom, Diversity
and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical Evaluation ofLinda F. Wightman's "The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education," 15 CONST. COMM. 11, 21 (1998). Thernstrom
stated:
[N]one of those who claimed that McGuire's information was 'incomplete and
distorted' saw fit to release complete and undistorted data that might have
refuted his charges. If he had been all wrong, it should have been easy to
demonstrate it. The magnitude of the preferences being given to minority
applicants to law schools remained a closely guarded secret.
Id.
Dean Jeffrey S. Lehman of the University of Michigan Law School, which is currently
defending itself from a reverse discrimination lawsuit, hedges somewhat in his defense of
racial preferences. Jeffrey S. Lehman, A Statement from the Dean, available at
http://141.211.44.5 l/newsandinfo/lawsuit/statement.htm (defending racial preferences as a
means of ensuring crucial diversity while claiming that "racial diversity is a secondary
interest," but not revealing the relevant statistical disparities between students admitted for
diversity reasons and other students). As this Article went to press, a federal district court
found that Michigan's racial preferences amounted not to a "secondary interest" but to racial
quotas. Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97CV75928-DT, 2001 WL 293196, *25 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
27, 2001) ("The practical effect of the law school's policy is indistinguishable from a
straight quota system").
o Thernstrom, supra note 58, at 19-20.
o Id at20. Also consider this memorandum, sent from Yale Law School Associate Dean
Stephen Yandle to Yale law students, after admissions data had been released to a student
writing a research paper on affirmative action:
[I]n light of the rumors that are circulating that certain individuals and groups-
minority students and groups--have subpar credentials, I do want to say a bit about
what could have been discovered from the information if a recipient had
compromised confidentiality. One of the reports contains a grid with LSAT scores
in small bands on one axis and GPA's in small bands on the other. "Cells" are
produced for the possible GPA and LSAT combinations. There are no minority
students in the Law School whose credentials occupy a cell that is not also
occupied by non-minority students or not adjacent to a cell occupied by non-
minority students. In short there are no minority students whose individual
credentials are statistically different from non-minority students. That is not to say
that there are no differences among the credentials of students in this law school
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In fact, like elsewhere in academia, racial preferences are rampant in American
law school admissions. According to a study conducted by Linda Wightman, a
supporter of affirmative action/racial preferences, based on their LSAT score and
GPAs eighty percent of law school offers of admission to African American
applicants in 1990-91 were the result of racial preferences.6 Moreover, preferences
were particularly dramatic at elite law schools. Among the schools Wightman
tagged as most selective and prestigious, 17.5 times as many African American
students were admitted as would have been the case if academic qualifications alone
had been taken into account.6' On the lower end of things, approximately half of
all African American matriculants to law school in 1991 would not have been
admitted to any law school based purely on their numbers.63 These statistics
exaggerate the role of racial preferences to some degree, because even race-neutral
admissions officers would take into account factors other than tests scores and
GPA, such as overcoming adversity, which would likely disproportionately benefit
African Americans. Nevertheless, "Professor Wightman is doubtless correct that
(although the differences are remarkably small), but to say that the range of
credentials among minority students is congruent with the credential range of non-
minority students. Another report shows mean credentials for students by ethnic
group. It reveals that the mean LSAT for minority student is within the LSAT's
standard error of measurement of the mean for non-minority students. When
separate ethnic groups are broken out the variance changes only slightly in spite of
the potential for greater variance as groups become quite small. The GPA
differences among groups are similar in magnitude.
Memorandum from Stephen D. Yandle to Yale Law School Students, April 6, 1990
(reprinted with permission).
The point of this memo is to argue that any differences between minority and non-
minority students are inconsequential. In fact, however, a close reading reveals that no non-
minority students share the same admissions cell with the least-credentialed minority
students, and the memo does not say how many students are in each cell. Moreover, while
the overall mean for minority students compared to white students is within the standard
measurement of error for the LSATs (currently 2.7 points, see http://www.powerscore.
com/scale.htm), the gap is greater than that for some minority groups' median. The most
significant omission in the memo, however, is that Yale, as the most selective school in the
country, gets the very best minority students, some of whom would be admitted regardless
of race. Therefore, discussion of means (averages) significantly obscures the likelihood that
the gap between the minority students with the lowest numbers-the ones who benefit most
from racial preferences-and the class mean is quite large, and significantly larger than the
gap between the mean and the lowest-numbered non-minority students. The racial
preferences in admission might be even more dramatic if medians rather than means were
considered. Note that Dean Yandle, like Dean Areen, could have settled the controversy by
releasing any relevant statistics that would not have revealed confidential information.
6 See Wightman, supra note 58, at 16 tbl.5.
62 Id. at 30 tbl. 6.
63 Id. at 22 tbl. 5.
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strong racial preferences were given in the law school admissions process in the
1990-91 application cycle." At Boalt Hall, admissions of African American
students precipitously dropped once the school stopped using racial preferences.65
The main reason universities lie about their racial preference programs is
because many such programs are at least arguably illegal. In the famous Bakke
case," four Justices concluded that racial preferences always violate Title VI, which
bans discrimination by federally funded schools.6" Justice Powell, concurring in
reversing the University of California's quota system, concluded that racial
preferences were legal only if they were used as a plus factor along the lines of
other plus factors universities use to diversify their student bodies.68 Many
universities, however, treat racial minorities, especially African Americans, as
members of a special category that gets far more favorable treatment than any other
discrete category. Even making the controversial assumption that Justice Powell's
concurrence in Bakke is the holding of the case,69 and assuming that this holding has
not been overridden by later Supreme Court decisions on racial preferences,7 many
schools still violate the law." Making less heroic assumptions, all racial preference
programs by public or private universities violate federal law. For a school to admit
it engages in racial preferences would be to invite litigation by disgruntled white
students rejected by the school.
While public university racial preference programs have suffered stinging
political and legal defeats over the last several years,72 private universities largely
Themstrom, supra note 58, at 16.
61 See Lynda Gorov, Affirmative-Action Ban Alters Terrain in Calif, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 23, 1997, at Al.
66 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
67 Id.
68 Id at 314, 317-18 (Powell, J., concurring).
69 A dubious assumption. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, I GREEN BAG 2d
381 (1998).
70 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,944 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke is not binding precedent). But cf Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233
F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court will treat Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke binding until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise).
"' See Alan J. Meese, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment: Bakke
Betrayed, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479 (2000) [hereinafter Meese, Bakke Betrayed]
(discussing how many university affirmative action programs violate federal law); Meese,
Reinventing Bakke, supra note 69, at 386.
' The Third Circuit has held that non-remedial preferences in the employment of public
high school faculty is illegal. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Township of Piscataway, 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Fourth Circuit has outlawed state university
scholarships reserved for members of minority groups. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d
147 (4th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit has held that racial preferences at state universities are
unconstitutional. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. California and Washington have enacted
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have carried on with their preference programs without interference. The opponents
of racial preferences-most prominently The Center for Individual Rights, which
litigated the Hopwood case-have refrained from suing private schools for
libertarian ideological reasons.73 Eventually, however, private schools will be sued
for discriminating against white and/or Asian applicants. A plaintiff could bring a
case against a private university under Title VI,74 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which outright
bans discrimination in educational and other settings,' and state antidiscrimination
laws.
Universities could respond to an anti-racial preferences lawsuit with a variety
of First Amendment defenses, the most promising of which post-Dale would be an
expressive association defense. Just as employing Dale would have diluted the Boy
Scouts' anti-homosexual activity message, forcing private universities to adopt race-
neutral admissions policies would dilute their pro-diversity message. Not
unreasonably, the administrators of elite universities believe that if the law prohibits
them from utilizing racial preferences, instead in effect requiring them to have an
overwhelmingly white (and, increasingly, Asian American) class, it will be far more
difficult to promote to their students the ideals of racial diversity and assistance to
disadvantaged minorities.7'
referenda that ban government racial preferences, CAL. CONST., art. I § 31 (2001) (Prop.
209), Rev. Code Wash. § 49.60400 (2000) (Wash. Initiative 200), and Florida is dismantling
its university affirmative action program. See Equity in Education-Executive Summary at
http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/government/learn/oneflorida/educationSummary.
html.
7 See Terry Carter, On a Roll (back), 84 A.B.A. J. 54, 56 (1998).
7 See generally Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983)
(finding that the Title VI prohibitions on racial discrimination mirror those of the Equal
Protection Clause). However, there is some ambiguity as to whether a Title VI lawsuit could
be successful, given current federal regulatory guidance to universities. Well-established
precedent suggests that Spending Clause statutes "must give potential recipients of federal
funding unambiguous notice of the conditions they assume when such funds are accepted
before liability under such a statute may be allowed." Issachoroff, supra note 58, at 673
n. 11. The Department of Education's implementing regulations allow for racial preferences
well beyond what a reasonable interpretation of Bakke allow. See generally Meese, Bakke
Betrayed, supra note 71, at 493.
" See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Section 1981 has been held to apply
to a white person who suffers discrimination, even though the statutory language also seems
to preclude this possibility. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,287
(1976). However, the statutory language clearly applies only to state and not private
discriminatory action. Once the Supreme Court decided to ignore the statutory language in
one regard, it apparently saw no reason to adhere to the language in other contexts.
76 It will also, of course, become more difficult to aid minority students directly by
admitting them, but this is not an interest protected by the expressive association right, but
rather seems more like the general right of association that the Runyon Court held cannot
justify discrimination. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-76.
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Moreover, having a racially homogenous class inherently sends a negative or
at best indifferent message about the importance of diversity. Engaging in racial
preferences on behalf of under represented minorities, by contrast, sends a message
to both students and the world at large that the university rejects applying dubious
"meritocratic" standards in a society that has what many argue amounts to an
entrenched racial hierarchy." Recall that in Dale the Court held that the Boy
Scouts had a First Amendment right to teach "by example."' Similar arguments
could be made to protect a university's right to engage in racial preferences in
hiring.
There are no barriers to a school's asserting an expressive association defense
to Section 1981 or state antidiscrimination laws that simply prohibit race
discrimination.79 A First Amendment defense to Title VI, however, is a trickier
matter. In Grove City College v. Bell,8" the Supreme Court held that the paperwork
requirements of Title IX, an amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, do not
conflict with the First Amendment because private colleges are free to avoid Title
IX's dictates by refusing federal funds.8 Courts could rule that by analogy Title VI
does not conflict with the First Amendment because schools could evade its
strictures by eschewing government money.
However, as this Author has discussed elsewhere, 2 Grove City should be
overruled, and in any event the case may very well be of limited precedential value
because of its very narrow facts. Grove City, for example, involved a minor loss of
funding and a minor, tangential infringement on First Amendment rights. By
contrast, a successful Title VI case against racial preferences would involve both
a major infringement on the right of expressive association, and, because of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1990, jeopardize all of a university's federal
" For a passionate defense of affirmative action on these and other grounds, see Jamin
B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, at http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/
may95raskin.htm. Unfortunately, among other weaknesses in this article, Raskin cannot
resist what appears to be the common urge among proponents of racial preferences to accuse
those who disagree with them of being racists. See infra note 86.
It would aid the universities' case that basing admissions primarily on test scores and
GPA is dubious if they refrained from applying this standard to all students but under-
represented minority students.
78 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640; 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
7' Note, however, that a litigant probably would argue that universities are closer to the
primarily non-expressive, commercial Jaycees organization than to the primarily expressive
Boy Scouts. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). On the one hand, it is difficult to argue that universities are not primarily
expressive. On the other hand, a university degree does confer economic advantages on its
recipients that leadership in the Boy Scouts does not.
80 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
8, Id. at 575-76.
82 See Bernstein, supra note 36, at 152.
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funding, including federally guaranteed student loans." Since almost no colleges
are able to survive without federal funding, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
may very well apply."
The end result of private universities successfully asserting expressive
association defenses to lawsuits challenging racial preferences would be that racial
preferences in admissions would continue, but in a much more honest and healthy
way than is the case today. Because universities fail to acknowledge that they
engage in racial preferences, many otherwise well-informed people, including many
of the beneficiaries of racial preferences, are unaware of their existence and scope.
Many students, especially minority students, at best take universities' official
position of non-discrimination (or, as Dean Hill claimed, their use of race merely
as a tie-breaker) at face value, and at worst suspect invidious discrimination in
admissions against minorities. Consider that the official web site of the Law School
Admissions Council states: "We often hear.. . in the Office of Minority Affairs
at Law School Admission Council: 'Is it okay to say I'm a minority student when
I apply to law schools? I've heard it's better not to tell."'85 Ironically, those who
correctly point out that African Americans are heavily favored in admissions are
dismissed as racist cranks."
Ultimately, having universities successfully defend racial preferences on
expressive association grounds would be a win-win situation. First, the right of
private schools with an ideological commitment to promoting racial diversity to
engage in racial preferences would be secure. Second, the litigation would force the
universities to admit that they engage in racial preferences. Ideally, the schools
would also provide details regarding the scope of their preferences so that the
debate on affirmative action could proceed openly and honestly."7
School officials repeatedly tell African American students that as a group they
arejust as qualified academically as their white classmates. Yet, when grades come
in, it becomes clear that on average African American students get significantly
lower grades than whites." Given the counterfactual spin by university
83 See id
84 See id. at 153.
85 Http://www.lsac.org/minorities-in-legal-education-selected-articles.asp#Showing Your
Color: Minority Applicants and Law School Admission.
16 See, e.g., D'SOuzA, infra note 101, at 194-200 (recounting that students denounced
as "racist" a professor who defined affirmative action as "preferential treatment in hiring,
promotion, and college admissions"); Anthony T. Pierre, Leslie M. Turner, & Steven M.
Hilton, Editorial, Degrees of Success, WASH. POST, May 8, 1991, at A31 (dismissing the
student who started the Georgetown Law Center controversy as a racist crank).
87 See CARTER, supra note 57, at 14-15 (arguing that universities should be open about
their racial preferences).
" For example, an early 1980s study of the nation's top ten law schools found that the
average African American student's GPA was at the eighth percentile of his class. ROBERT
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spokespeople that various student populations have equivalent academic credentials,
this anomaly could only be explained if universities are institutionally racist, and
hidden racism is rampant.8 9 In the atmosphere of mistrust that is engendered, all
sorts of pernicious and foolish notions thrive." More honesty about admissions
policy would go a long way toward reducing this mistrust.
Some would no doubt argue that schools that acknowledged their racial
preferences publicly would be not be able to successfully defend themselves in the
court of public opinion. In some cases, that may be true. But if a particular
school's racial preferences cannot be defended publicly, perhaps the school should
rethink the scope of its preferences.9' On the other hand, if universities were more
forthright in their acknowledgment and defense of racial preferences in admissions,
they might be able to develop a much stronger constituency in favor of the
preferences. Moreover, a forthright acknowledgment by elite universities of the
difficulty in finding African American (and to a lesser extent, Latino) students with
the schools' standard required credentials92 might lead to some useful national soul-
KLrrGAARD, CHOOS[NGELITES 162-63 (1985). A late 1980s study showed that the mean law
school GPA of African American students in California was at "around the 15th percentile."
See Stephen P. Klein, Disparities in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among Racial/Ethnic Groups:
Their Size, Source, and Implications, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 517, 524 (1991). At elite
undergraduate institutions, a recent book shows that "the cumulative grade-point average of
the African-American students ... puts them at the 23rd percentile (i.e., in the bottom
quarter) of their class." Even that figure is "deceptively rosy," because it does not
differentiate "between black students admitted regularly and those admitted preferentially."
Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Racial Preferences: What We Now Know,;
Affirmative Action in University and College Admissions, COMMENT., Feb. 1999, at 44.
89 This is not to deny that racism, institutional and otherwise, still exists on university
campuses. Rather, I am arguing that at most schools, especially elite schools, such racism
is not the primary cause of the academic difficulties faced by African Americans.
o For example, pseudo-scientific Afrocentricism is rampant in American universities,
see MARY LEFKowITz, NOT OUT OF AFRICA: How AFROCENTRISM BECAME AN EXCUSE TO
TEACH MYTH As HISTORY (1997), and African Americans are the only group in America
whose level of anti-Semitism is positively correlated with youth and education. See, e.g.,
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Editorial, Black Demagogues and Pseudo-Scholars, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 1992 at A 15 (condemning this trend of "top-down anti-Semitism, in large part the
province of the better-educated classes").
"' Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 672-73 (arguing that while University of Texas
admitted the extent of its racial preferences only in response to litigation, "it behooves any
institution of higher education ... to account for how it confers this important societal
benefit").
9 For example, in 1996-97 only 103 African Americans and 224 Hispanics had a college
GPA of 3.25 or above and LSAT scores at or above the 83.5 percentile, and only sixteen
African Americans and forty-five Hispanics achieved the 92.3 (164 LSAT) percentile with
a 3.50 or higher GPA. See John E. Morris, Boalt Hall's Affirmative Action Dilemma, AM.
LAWYER, Nov. 1997, at 4.
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searching regarding the educational opportunities given minority students.
IH. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AND SPEECH CODES
Modem universities generally have portrayed their primary mission as pursuing
truth.93 Anything that could interfere with that mission, such as restrictions on
freedom of speech on campus, has been considered anathema. More recently, some
colleges explicitly have "enunciate[d] special educational goals that are understood
to be inherently incompatible with racist expression." 4 For example, Mount
Holyoke has announced that "[o]ur community is committed to maintaining an
environment in which diversity is not only tolerated, but celebrated."9 The goal of
Mary Washington College, meanwhile, "is to help all students achieve academic
success in an environment that nurtures, encourages growth, and develops
sensitivity and appreciation for all people."'
To promote respect for diversity, many universities have restricted through
speech codes certain types of expression in order to create a more open and
inclusive atmosphere for minority students. Advocates claim that speech codes
express a university's opposition to hate speech and demonstrate commitment to the
creation of a non-discriminatory educational environment in which all views can be
heard, if expressed collegially.' Moreover, even ineffectual speech codes are said
to send a symbolic message that minorities' interests will be taken into account.98
93 For example, the motto of my alma mater, Brandeis University, founded in 1947, is
"Truth Even Unto Its Innermost Parts."
94 Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF
RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, ClVIL RIGHTS, AND CiviL LIBERTIES 117, 121
(Henry Louis Gates Jr. et al., eds. 1994).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 122.
9' See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at
37, 42-43; see also Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2371 (1989) (speech codes protect the values of
"inclusion, education, development of knowledge, and ethics that universities exist and stand
for."). As Professor Randall Kennedy puts it:
If a group of people want to get together and say, "We're tired of people going
on campus and saying all sorts of things which in our view degrade a
community of scholars. We don't think it's good for scholarship for people to
go around using the word 'nigger' or the word 'kike.' If you're on this campus,
you use that word and you're off it. We don't want that." Why isn't it
consonant with your principles to let a thousand flowers bloom, and for those
people to be able to speak by a creating a campus that is to their liking. There
are a lot of other campuses.
SPEECH AND EQUALITY: Do WE REALLY HAVE TO CHOOSE? 75 (Gary LaMarche, ed. 1996).
98 See Matsuda, supra note 97.
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In practice, speech codes are often not so innocuous. Instead of being sincere
efforts to create a campus climate of tolerance and understanding, speech codes are
frequently written and/or enforced in such a way as to empower left-wing,
"politically correct" elements of the university community to censor their
ideological opponents." As one expert notes, "too often, campus hate speech
policies and those responsible for their enforcement are not interested in free speech
or a level playing field, they are interested in retribution and competitive advantage
in winning the minds of incoming students by silencing and punishing their
opponents.""W
Indeed, in the early 1990s some conservatives, enraged by what they perceived
as political correctness run amok on college campuses, 0 1 advocated banning speech
codes at private universities. " Their unlikely bedfellow was the ACLU, which saw
an opportunity to achieve its dual goals of expanding freedom of expression and
weakening the public-private distinction that normally shields private organizations
from being subject to constitutional restraints.
An effort by the ACLU and Representative Henry Hyde to pass a law requiring
federally funded universities to protect freedom of speech on campus eventually
died,'0 3 as did a similar effort by Senator Larry Craig."° California, however,
99 See, e.g., RICHARD BERNSTEIN, DICTATORSHIP OF VIRTUE 112-15 (1994); ALAN C.
KORS & HARvEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY
ON AMERICA'S CAMPUSES (1998); JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS 26 (1993);
Michael S. Greve, Civil Rights and UncivilSpeech, 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 1, 16 (1994). On
the incredible variety of (mostly) non-racist comments that have been denounced as racist,
and thus potentially actionable under many campus speech codes, see Paul Trout, Racist as
an Epithet of Repression, at http://mtprof.msun.edu/Fall1995/trout.html.
100 TIMOTHY C. SCHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 62-63 (1998). Such a goal
may be defensible at a private university, if the university publicly enunciates its goal to
exalt what its governing authorities believe to be the "good and true, which means
suppressing the bad and the false in the process of constructing hierarchies of intellectual
virtue." Randall Kennedy, Should Private Universities Voluntarily Bind Themselves to the
First Amendment? No!, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 21, 1994, at B 1. Much of the
harm caused by speech codes results from universities claiming to believe in free expression
and the unhampered search for truth, but not following that stated goal in practice.
'0' The most prominent book documenting political correctness on campus was DINESH
D'SOUzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION (1991).
'02 Many conservatives, however, opposed such measures as unjustified instrusions on
private conduct. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Henry Hyde and the ACLU Propose a Fate
Worse than PCness, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1991, at A 15. For a left-wing critique of the
hypocrisy of conservatives who supported the Hyde Bill, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Comments
of an Outsider on the First Amendment, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST
SPEECH 174 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
103 See Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1st Sess.
199 1); Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech andDemocracy in America: An Essay
for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 341 (1992) (referring to ACLU's "virtual
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passed the "Leonard Law," which requires public and private schools to follow First
Amendment strictures when determining whether to regulate speech. In other
words, if speech would be protected by the First Amendment if the government
tried to punish the speaker, a private school also may not punish a member of the
school community who engages in such speech.'"5
Stanford University found that its (relatively mild) speech code"° ran afoul of
co-sponsorship" of the bill).
For an apologia, see Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech
Protection Act of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L.
REv. 1469 (1991).
'0 Freedom of Speech on Campus Act of 1991, S. 1484, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991).
lOS It should be noted that California's Leonard Law is not the only state law that bars
speech codes. Many states have constitutions that grant an affirmative right of freedom of
speech, rather than simply preventing the government from regulating speech as the First
Amendment does. Courts in some of these states have held that such constitutional language
grants protection of rights to free expression against large nongovenmental authorities that
sometimes serve as public forums, such as shopping malls or universities. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, for example, has ruled that Princeton University violated a non-student's
free expression rights when it ejected him from the campus for distributing political
information. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1980). If a university like Princeton is
considered a public forum for uninvited visitors, a fortiori it would also be a public forum
for the students at the school with whom the university voluntarily associates. Speech codes,
then, would not be permissible unless the university could mount an expressive association
defense under Dale.
'0 As summarized by the California Superior Court, the speech code was
"intended to clarify the point at which free expression ends and prohibited
discriminatory harassment begins." As defined by the Speech Code, prohibited
harassment includes "discriminatory intimidation by threats of violence and also
includes personal vilification of students on the basis of their sex, race, color,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin."
Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification
if it:
(a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
(b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or
stigmatizes; and
(c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols.
The Speech Code defines insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols
as those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite to an
immediate breach of the peace, and which are commonly understood to convey
direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis of their
sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin."
Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995),
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/special/corrym.shtml at 2.
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the Leonard Law. Stanford defended itself in state court on First Amendment
grounds, 7 arguing, among other things, that the Leonard Law violated its right to
expressive association. The court ruled against Stanford, reasoning that Roberts
required the university to prove: (1) state-sponsored viewpoint discrimination; (2)
that observers are likely to believe that offensive speech by Stanford's students was
endorsed by Stanford; or (3) that Stanford did not have adequate means at its
disposal to rebut or separate itself from any offensive speech by its students.'°0
Regardless of whether this test was an appropriate extrapolation from Roberts,
this opinion is clearly not good law after Dale.'" The Scouts were not required to
meet such a test, and, in fact, almost certainly could not meet such a test. All the
Scouts needed to prove was that the organization promoted, to some small degree,
a particular view of homosexual activity, and that obeying the law in question
would interfere with its ability to promote this point of view. A university that can
show that it is committed to maintaining a harmonious campus environment, even
at the expense of free speech, thus has an expressive association right to disobey
state law and enforce rules banning speech offensive to certain groups." °
CONCLUSION
One commentator, writing before Dale, suggested that "under the First
Amendment, discrimination of any kind in choosing one's fellows in the
conscience-forming enterprise must be viewed as protected expression. "' At least
107 Id. at 3.
108 Id.
'0 The opinion may also be incompatible with Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) ("GLIB"). See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan
D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish
There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537, 1609 (1998). However, the GLIB opinion
did not clearly rest on the right of expressive association. See id.; Bernstein, supra note 30.
0 Ironically, if Stanford were to reestablish its speech code, it may not be able to defend
itself on expressive association grounds. In the litigation just discussed, Stanford claimed
to be unreservedly "committed to the principals of free inquiry and free expression." The
speech code itself stated that students have a "right to hold and vigorously defend and
promote their opinions .... Respect for this right requires that students tolerate even
expression of opinions which they find abhorrent." Corry, supra note 106, at 37.
Even after Dale, it will be difficult for a school to win an expressive association case
against the Leonard Law or similar litigation if the school refuses to argue that it believes
that freedom of expression should be sacrificed to other ends. Many schools that have
speech codes seem unwilling to admit that they are in fact suppressing speech, instead
claiming they are simply trying to obey Title VI or Title IX. To be entitled to a Dale defense,
however, these schools will have to publicly acknowledge that their speech codes in fact
restrict speech.
... Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the First Amendment: Constitutional Limits
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with regard to nonprofit, expressive associations, this is now the law of the land.
Left-wingers have expressed dismay at the result in Dale, and the potential
consequences of the decision. Not only did Dale deal a blow to the gay rights
movement, but any nonprofit, primarily expressive group with a discriminatory
ideology may now have a First Amendment right to discriminate. Many
organizations with opprobrious ideas will evade antidiscrimination laws using Dale
as a defense. If the Ku Klux Klan were to start an exclusionary university devoted
to promoting segregation and white supremacy,"' Dale would provide
constitutional protection.
But protecting the liberty of those whose views one hates also protects one's
own liberty. Dale provides protection for private universities that engage in
affirmative discrimination in favor of students of color. Elite universities and
graduate schools are a strong redoubt of American leftism, and racial preferences
at these universities are an integral part of the left's agenda. The legality of these
preferences, however, is open to serious question, and political and legal trends are
not favorable. Ironically, to save their own preferred version of discrimination from
legal attack, the left may ultimately need to rely on the same constitutional doctrine
of expressive association that protected the reviled Boy Scouts from New Jersey's
antidiscrimination law.
Moreover, Dale's rejuvenation of the right of expressive association renders
laws banning speech codes by private universities unconstitutional. Because of
Dale, not only will private universities likely have a constitutional right to engage
in racial preferences in admissions, but also a right to punish criticism of such
preferences as racist."' A university that forbids criticism of its controversial racial
on the Reach ofAnti-Discrimination Law, 9 LAW & SEX 163, 276 (1999-2000).
112 Even Randall Kennedy, a particularly cogent "progressive" scholar on these issues,
could not when asked countenance the possibility that "Ku Klux Klan University" should
be permitted to operate in defiance of antidiscrimination laws. See SPEECH AND EQUALITY,
supra note 97, at 80-82.
13 See CARTER, supra note 57, at 176. Carter argues:
Very often, these [campus speech] codes are written in language easily broad
enough to cover-that is, forbid-the speech of students who want to argue that
other students, admitted because of explicit racial preferences, are less capable
than students who were admitted without them. Many students, and not a few
professors, have argued that the codes should be adopted with that idea in mind.
Id.; see generally D'SOUZA, supra note 101, at 238-29 (On many campuses "there is a de
facto taboo against a free discussion of affirmative action.., and efforts to open such a
discussion are considered presumptively racist.").
To some, criticizing racial preferences is itself inherently racist and should be censored.
For example, the Chicago City Colleges' Board of Trustees sued a teachers' union for
printing a satirical critique of affirmative action in its newsletter, and thus allegedly creating
an illegal hostile environment. See Eugene Volokh, Is Criticizing Affirmative Action Illegal
in Chicago?, JEWISH WORLD REv., Aug. 30, 1999. At California State University in
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preference policies is hardly everyone's ideal institution of higher learning, and in
stifling free expression such a school would run the risk of sacrificing educational
excellence to political correctness."4 But, then again, liberals of all stripes could
boycott such universities and give their talents to universities that uphold liberal
values. Permitting illiberal behavior to go unregulated can be infuriating.
Paradoxically, however, as the Court recognized in Dale, tolerating illiberal
behavior is the price we pay for living in a liberal society." 5
Northridge, one student editor was suspended for running a cartoon making fun of
affirmative action. A second student was then suspended for criticizing the university's
action against the first student. BERNSTEIN, DICTATORSHIP OF VIRTUE, supra note 99, at 209.
Another controversy over an affirmative action cartoon erupted at the University of New
Mexico, with attendant cries of racism. See http://www.contumacy.org/4NHNT.html. As
noted previously, see supra note 86, the student who initiated the controversy over racial
preferences at Georgetown Law Center was denounced as a racist. See also
http://mtprof.msun.edu/Fall 1995/trout.html (citing various articles in which this student was
denounced as a racist).
Of course, the fact that a private university has the right to make and enforce a speech
code would not insulate that university from liability if it contractually bound itself to protect
freedom of expression on campus.
"" But cf Kennedy, supra note 100 ("I can easily imagine a vibrant, rigorous,
intellectually distinguished college whose governing authorities reject" the idea that the
purpose of a university is to serve as an open marketplace of ideas.).
"s Illiberal behavior may also have its benefits. See NANCY ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP
AND MORALs 327 (1999). Rosenblum asserts:
I have highlighted the positive moral uses of incongruent associations that do
not conform (and do not wish to conform) to liberal democratic norms. They
may cultivate virtues, even if not peculiarly liberal or democratic ones, still
moral dispositions that are appreciated in liberal democracy. They may contain
vices, allowing them relatively safe expression. Where the conditions for
shifting involvement exist, membership may compensate for a deficit of social
experience in other areas.
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